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State Control and Governance of
Residential Communities
The case to be examined: community mediation in Shanghai
Peng Bo
1 Before applying the concept of governance (zhili) to Chinese questions, we must first
see how it emerged in the context of Western societies. To do this we propose to review
the history of the formation of the state in China and in the West, before exploring the
question of decentralisation of administrative procedures.
Back to the origins of governance: a historical and comparative perspective
2 Modern nation-states were preceded by forms of traditional states; the feudal system in
the  West,  or  the  oriental  “empire  with  its  hereditary  bureaucratic  system”2,  also
described as “historical bureaucratic empire”3. All were segmentary in form, and the
administrative  authority  exercised  by  the  state  authorities  was  extremely  limited4.
Amazingly perhaps, pre-modern forms of the state in both the West and the East share
the  same  characteristic,  namely,  a  gap  between  political  projects  at  the  top  and
effective management of society at the bottom, the principal cause being inadequate
resources and techniques. Eastern and Western states adapted very differently to this
situation. To put it simply, Western medieval societies developed a feudal system of
territories  and  titles.  In  China,  the  feudal  system  was  quickly  replaced  by  a
bureaucratic empire. In this system, although central government exercised in theory
absolute  control  over  society,  it  was  always  obliged  in  practice  to  rely  on  self-
management  at  the  base  of  society  to  compensate  for  the  inadequacy  of  central
administrative  power.  In  Chinese  villages  where  “the  mountain  is  high  and  the
emperor is far away”, (shan gao, huangdi yuan), educated civil servants stood in for the
central authorities in the direction of local affairs. 
3 Western countries progressed from traditional power to the modern nation-state by
way  of  absolute  government.  Relying  on  the  resources  and  technical  conditions
provided  by  capitalism  and  industrialisation,  modern  nation-states  progressively
established a powerful control over the whole of society5.
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4 Since the end of  the Qing dynasty,  particularly because of  the challenges posed by
outside forces6,  and because of the internal logic of evolution7,  the structure of the
Chinese state also underwent a process of gradual transition. By strengthening its local
control and increasing its fiscal resources, central government progressively destroyed
the traditional local model of self-administration8.  Local leaders had been deceiving
those  above  as  well  as  those  below them,  embezzling  the  state’s  tax  revenues  and
oppressing the people9: their institutionalisation was the main political cause for the
destruction of the countryside.
5 In the period following 1949, the new socialist state pursued modernisation as well as
the historical process of extending the power of the central administration. By creating
people’s communes in the countryside and work units in the cities, entities that were
both  economic  and  administrative10,  the  state  was  able  to  extend  its  central
administrative apparatus despite its meagre resources. The launching of the reforms,
the breakdown of the collective rural economy and the declining influence of work
units in the cities have endangered this balance.
6 In  Western  societies,  the  building  of  a  modern,  democratic  nation-state  has  been
accompanied by a concentration of power and by the specialisation of the bureaucratic
apparatus11. Even though a bureaucratic system has many faults, it is considered that
democracy helps to guarantee the defence of the common good. Citizens exert indirect
control  over  the  bureaucracy  through  their  elected  political  leaders  and  the  civil
service mandarins. In the United States, the age of Franklin D. Roosevelt represented a
golden age of public confidence in the central bureaucracy, by virtue of its efficiency12. 
7 During the second half of the twentieth century, as administrations’ tasks became more
complex,  numbers  of  those  who  questioned  the  bureaucratic  state  increased.  This
reappraisal also arose from other factors: the challenge posed to bureaucratic systems
was not only related to their inefficiency and corruption, but resulted from ideological
changes, and from the renewed vigour of individualism and neo-liberalism.
8 The problems of inefficiency and corruption in bureaucratic states, the cost of welfare
states became increasingly intolerable. For economists this was reflected in the renewal
of the Austrian School and by the transition from scientific heterodoxy to fashionable
science13.  In  political  theory14,  this  led  to  the  conservative  reforms  brought  in  by
President Reagan in the United States and by the Thatcher government in the United
Kingdom. In the 1980s, public administration systems in New Zealand and Australia
were  reformed.  This  wind  of  change,  later  to  be  labelled  as  “the  New  Public
Management”, blew across Europe and then influenced the US and Asia15. Numerous
researchers  have  showed that  these  reforms were  aimed not  so  much at  changing
methods of  public  management as  at  satisfying electorates  greedy for  change,  thus
emphasising the ideological dimension16.
9 Amid  growing  mistrust  of  bureaucratic  administration,  the  management  of  public
affairs  has  been  placed  in  new  hands:  non-governmental  organisations,  social
mediation  structures  and  private  organisations.  This  new  model  is  put  together
according to governance theory redefining the relations between state  and society.
Central administrative organisations and public ministries are no longer the only levers
for promoting the common interest. Voluntary organisations and private bodies may
also serve the public  welfare,  and do so  more efficiently.  As  voluntary and private
bodies  are  brought  into  the  management  of  public  affairs,  the  distinction  between
public  and  private  becomes  blurred.  Lastly,  whereas  according  to  traditional
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democratic  theory the  struggle  between political  parties  assures  the  pursuit  of  the
public  good,  the  advocates  of  governance  say  that  a  network  linking  the  different
elements of  society may provide a structural  base for their  collective management;
they  hold  that  communities  other  than  the  strictly  geographic  may  also  acquire
democratic autonomy17.
Mediation in the perspective of governance
10 International  scientific  research  distinguishes  three  types  of  mediation  (tiaojie)  in
China’s history: a traditional period preceding modernisation; the Maoist period; and
the age of openness and reforms. By comparing the mediation phenomena associated
with these different historical moments, we are able to identify why they were needed,
their function within the political society as a whole and their operating mechanism. 
11 Two kinds of theory account for the appearance of mediation in socialist China. In a
culturalist  perspective,  Jerome  Cohen  considers  that  the  characteristic  conciliation
systems of communist China and traditional China, despite divergences between Maoist
thinking and Confucian ideology, arise out of dislike for any legal proceedings18. Thus,
in China, people attach great importance to “criticism-education”, to self-criticism and
voluntary good behaviour. On this point, the Chinese and Russian legal systems are
miles apart: the organisation of the Chinese legal system and the practice of mediation
show that Chinese socialism is far from merely imitating practices in other socialist
countries. Other writers take a functionalist approach. For Stanley Lubman19, there is
no  question  of  considering  mediation  in  socialist  China  merely  as  an  extension  of
traditional culture; it has an important functional significance in the political practice
of Chinese communism. Mediation procedures in the new China derive from the needs
of governance and perform a real function. 
12 According to some writers, mediation in traditional China expresses the reluctance to
take legal action, the main purpose of mediation being to remove most disputes from
the official legal context. Settling an argument outside the courts is quicker and less
expensive than suing someone. Mediation is a substitute for a court action and draws
its strength from the tendency, within the Chinese political tradition, to leave people to
sort out their own problems.
13 In Lubman’s view, socialist China has invested mediation with a new political function:
it  contributes  to  the  state’s  overall  objective  of  restructuring  society20.  Through
mediation, the state fulfils its political objective of mobilising the masses. As part of
this process, the state’s purposes are effectively and completely applied to the lowest
level of society. 
14 In socialist China, mediation is at the same time a technique for political control and a
mechanism that complements the law, two aims that can sometimes turn out to be in
conflict.  The launch of  the reforms undoubtedly exposed internal  contradictions in
mediation.  New  disagreements  arose,  imposing  considerable  pressure  on  the  legal
system. So may we assert that the political function of the practice of mediation has
given place to its social function? Putting the question another way, what changes has
the political function of mediation undergone since 1978?
The situation with community mediation
15 Community mediation (shequ tiaojie) is applied to civil offences and minor criminal
offences. It intervenes between civilians, and concerns marital and family disputes, or
quarrels  between  neighbours,  colleagues,  fellow-residents,  individual  entrepreneurs
(getihu), contracted entrepreneurs or associates. Such disputes are mainly about rights
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to and interest in money, or about other matters—emotional or conjugal, for example.
Disputes between individual entrepreneurs or production managers, on the one hand,
and private individuals or residential communities involved in economic activity on the
other, are also extremely common. By the usual definition, mediation means that a
third party undertakes conciliation between two other parties, appealing to the laws
and state  rules  and regulations,  so  as  to  persuade them voluntarily  to  agree a  fair
compromise and to drop any further proceedings21.
16 Mediation has several essential characteristics. First of all, the third party must come
from outside the field of conflict and be able to take an impartial position in proceeding
to conciliation; secondly, he or she must base their counsel and guidance on laws, rules
and  regulations;  and  thirdly,  the  recourse  to  mediation  presupposes  that  the  two
disputing parties  are  participating voluntarily,  any eventual  accord being based on
reciprocal forgiveness and accepted of their own free will.
17 The job of People’s Mediation (renmin tiaojie) is, in its narrow sense, that carried out
by a People’s Mediation Committee (renmin tiaojie weiyuanhui); in its wider sense it
has three aspects: (1) gathering the necessary information and producing it at the right
moment; (2) anticipating all sorts of disagreements and quarrels that can crop up in
various communities while finding a compromise between the parties; and (3) bringing
the settlement to the community’s attention22. 
18 Chinese  traditional  society  is  “not  litigious”  (wusong).  In  this  context,  People’s
Mediation plays an important role in calming industrial strife and fills the space left
vacant by the ineffectual application of legal and administrative services23. Ever since
socialist  China  was  founded,  the  system  of  People’s  Mediation  has  attracted  much
attention.  It  was  given legal  status  in  1954  when the  “Directive  on the  Temporary
Organisation  of  People’s  Mediation  Committees”  was  promulgated.  In  1980,  the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress ratified the new “General Law on
the Temporary Organisation of People’s Mediation Committees”. In 1982, the Chinese
Constitution and the Law on Civil Procedures confirmed the system. 
 
Stratification of the People’s Mediation System in Shanghai
19 According to the 1982 Constitution, the People’s Mediation Committees and the Public
Security  and  Hygiene  Committees  form  Committees  of  Urban  and  Rural  Residents
(jumin weiyuanhui, cunmin weiyuanhui) which in practical terms manage the
mediation of civil disputes. On June 17th 1989, the “Directive on the Organisation of
People’s Mediation Committees” was promulgated. It stipulates that the Committees
should work under the direction of the People’s Government and of the People’s Legal
Bureau and that the daily work carried out by this government and its delegated organs
in the People’s Mediation Committees is assumed by legal assistants. In urban areas, the
State Control and Governance of Residential Communities
China Perspectives, 57 | january - february 2005
4
Residents’ Committees set up the People’s Mediation Committees; it is the Residents’
Committees that, with the help of the legal assistants of the local office, direct the work
of the People’s Mediation Committees at the level of the residential communities (see
table).
20 Taking as an example District A of Shanghai, the hierarchical structure of the system of
civil mediation is as follows: at district level (qu), the leadership committee of the work
of  civil  mediation  is  in  charge  of  overall  management  and  public  order.  Its  main
function is to harmonise the work of different departments of governmental bodies and
to take the lead in applying important political measures. The responsibility for some
practical daily tasks of administrative management is assigned to the three members of
the  district  legal  office.  The  office  chief  is  supported  by  two  young  agents,  newly
qualified, one in law and the other in administrative management. Together, the three
are responsible for controlling legal practice in different “Streets” (jiedao).
21 The  appropriate  administrative  body  at  the  street  level  is  the  legal  section.  The
“Directive on the Organisation of People’s Mediation Committees” stipulates that the
government  and its  delegated bodies  have  responsibility  for  guiding  the  Mediation
Committees of the Residents’ Committees; the mediation agreements must be kept in
conformity with the law and those who transgress them disciplined. Not only does the
legal section of the Street direct and supervise the work but the legal assistants of the
Street must also take part directly in settling disputes unresolved at the lower levels.
22 In District A, ten Streets have set up a legal section. The law stipulates that a legal
section  must  have  a  head  of  section  and  two  assistants.  Because  of  organisational
constraints,  the  legal  section  and the  office  of  general  administrative  management
have been merged into one body. With the exception of one Street that has not yet
created the post of head of the legal section, the heads of the other sections all exercise
a double function. All the Streets have created legal assistant posts. Between 2000 and
2002, the legal sections in the Streets have taken direct part in settling 282 disputes and
have intervened in that of 185 others24.
23 The  Law  on  the  Organisation  of  Residents’  Committees  requires  the  creation  of  a
People’s Mediation Committee subordinate to the Residents’ Committee. Each of the
194 residential areas (juminqu) of District A has a People’s Mediation Committee and a
post  of  head  of  mediation.  These  committees  have  1,527  members.  The  Mediation
Committee is usually composed of five to ten people, generally including the leader of
the  Residents’  Committee,  the  Party  Secretary  of  the  residential  community,  the
members of the Residents’ Committee responsible for culture and education, the heads
of organisations and police officers. The head of mediation is in general an employee
member of the Residents’ Committee, whose other tasks include the maintenance of
security, civil administration and health control. In two years, District A’s Mediation
Committees settled 8,265 disputes, prevented eight disputes involving 13 people from
becoming criminal prosecutions, and averted one unlawful killing.
24 At the level of apartment block groups (louzu)25, this district has in all 7,180 mediation
agents, of whom 2,379 are full-time employees (the others have additional jobs). These
mediators head the administration of groups of apartment blocks. The disputes they
are called upon to settle mostly have to do with quarrels between neighbours on which
we have no quantitative information. 
The socialisation of state controlWorking for People’s Mediation in the context of state
control
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25 For legal staff and administration officials, the status and the image of mediation work
are complex. On the one hand, People’s Mediation comes up in every aspect of society,
and between all sorts of individuals; affairs dealt with are frequently emotional and
highly complex; thus mediation work is both difficult and yet commonplace. On the
other  hand,  mediation,  just  like  the  Civil  Affairs  Bureau,  is  the  “front  line”  of
preserving the stability and unity of urban society.
26 Present demands, in terms of social stability,  are extremely high. In the system for
appraising civil servants, the economic and social development of their own area is a
determining criterion. The degree of stability among the local people is another. The
public  have become aware of  the possibility  of  appealing to  higher  authority  or  of
taking to the streets. One of our informants suggests: “People today know what they
[the civil servants] are worried about. They’re afraid people will take a complaint about
something trivial right to the top, or even attack the ‘Kang bureau’ and occupy Yinbin
Street26.”
27 From the state’s point of view, mediation helps to preserve social stability and acts as
an effective wheel  in the machine of  state control.  Civil  differences,  if  they can be
resolved at the level of the group of apartment blocks or of the Street, do not in general
require the intervention of the municipal administration. However, if one of the parties
engaged in the difference calls an emergency number (110, for example), the alarm is
raised and, however large or small the problem, the municipal police are automatically
obliged  to  pass  the  information  on  to  the  legal  bureau  of  the  district  where  the
difference  came  up,  and  then  to  the  Street  and  the  residential  community
committees27. 
28 For example, on December 6th 2002, at 08:26, an emergency 110 call was made about a
family dispute. The police intervened at once, passing on the information to the district
legal bureau. The legal assistant for the location of the dispute made contact with the
residents’ committee; the mediation official of this committee went straight away to
visit  the family.  Very swiftly the origins and the consequences of  the dispute were
reported to the legal office, as follows: “L is a provincial woman, formerly married to S.
Six months ago, after the divorce came through, S agreed that L should again come to
live  with  him.  L  spent  a  significant  amount  of  money  belonging  to  S.  Once  all  his
savings had disappeared, S wanted L to leave, but she refused. A dispute broke out. L
attacked S with a knife and the emergency call was made. In response to advice from
police  officers  and  from  the  residents’  committee,  calm  was  restored;  and  the
committee demanded that the problems arising from this post-divorce cohabitation
should be clearly sorted out.” On December 6th at 13:55, a report on the situation and
the outcome of mediation were passed on to the municipal police28. 
At the outer limits of state control
29 Shanghai is China’s shop window for the world. The city is at the sharp end of economic
development and represents the front line in the revitalisation of the system. The need
for social stability is all the more an imperative. From this point of view, rank and file
mediation agents appear to be working at the outer limits of the state’s control over
society. One interviewee said, “In our district, there are ten Streets each with its own
legal  assistants  and  several  receptionists,  194  residents’  committees  and  the  same
number of mediation heads who we are in the process of training (. . .) At a lower level,
we also have 1,500 mediation agents, with whom in general we have no direct contact.29
”
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30 In practical  terms,  among the mediators of  district  A,  within the network on three
levels  (Streets,  residents’  committees  and small  groups of  residents),  only the legal
assistants at Street level belong to the civil service. The receptionists are paid by the
Street. Most of the mediation officials of the residents’ committees are paid about 500
yuan a month, by the Street; and most of the 1,500 mediation agents are volunteers. So
the state, while socialising the extremities of its control over society, is transferring the
cost  to society.  This  system, arising from a lack of  resources,  is  moreover a highly
flexible and reactive one.
31 It is generally considered that developing the economy is the authorities’ first priority
and  that  the  officials  in  charge  of  economic  questions  and  production  ought
consequently to be at the top of the administrative hierarchy. That was not the opinion
of one official we interviewed. “Economic matters, anyone can take care of them,” he
said.  And  he  thought  that  the  top  jobs  should  be  given  to  officials  of  the  legal
departments who deal with complaints and manage the work of mediation30. Thus, the
selection of  mediation heads and mediators is  of  critical  importance,  because these
workers cannot place full reliance on the administrative power of higher authorities, or
on the law, or on support from the police. In most cases, they must call upon their own
social resources, and count on their personal standing for settling disputes.
32 In  quite  a  number of  cases,  it  is  impossible  to  fall  back on the law or  on political
measures  to  put  pressure upon the parties  in  dispute;  they in turn respond to  the
mediator’s  image.  Thus,  an  interviewee can say,  “These  days,  the  job  of  mediation
usually  comes  down  to  the  mediator’s  image,  his  moral  standing;  of  course,  the
mediator also needs to understand the law, as well as a little psychology. It’s a job for
an expert now. Really! ‘Use one word and people laugh; use another and they jump’ ”31.
A tricky problem for the community’s administrators
33 Leaving  society  to  take  charge  of  itself  has  undeniably  lowered  the  state’s  control
expenditure, at the very least, while maintaining the appearance of great efficiency.
Mediation is provided neither by the municipality nor by the district, but by the Street
and  the  residents’  committee.  Particularly,  it  is  the  Street,  the  lowest  level  of  the
administrative  hierarchy,  which  is  in  the  front  line,  assuming  the  heaviest
responsibility and paying the greatest price. In Street B, the state is responsible for
paying only 80 officials  and agents,  though staffing needs are far higher than that.
Police  services  alone  account  for  more  than  a  hundred  posts.  On  top  of  that,  the
monthly  500  yuan  must  be  found  for  each  of  the  mediators  of  the  residents’
committees. While the state has transferred the costs of its control to society itself, it
has in fact concentrated pressure on the last link in the administrative system: the
Street. And the Street faces two sometimes contradictory imperatives: developing the
economy and preserving social stability.
34 For example, legal assistant Q was confronted by the following problem: the air ducts of
a restaurant just about to open were a source of pollution and were harmful to the
quality of life of those living nearby. As assistant Q put it, “We are speaking of a very
large  restaurant  on  two  floors,  still  under  construction  –  although  the  staff  were
already in training. The two air ducts that the restaurant has installed do present, it’s
true, some risk to the local people’s quality of life, but up to now we haven’t made any
official report. This is partly because we don’t know how the restaurant will turn out
and  partly  because  we’re  going  to ask  the  planning  and  environmental  protection
departments to carry out a scientific appraisal.32” There is a good reason why the local
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office is  handling this  difference so circumspectly.  It  is  obvious that the restaurant
construction is  harmful  to the people living nearby;  but the legal  assistant has not
immediately taken the residents’  side because he knows that the restaurant will  be
good  for  the  local  economy. Furthermore,  without  knowing  precisely  the  financial
resources  of  the  restaurant,  an  over-hasty  demand for  higher  authorities  or  other
bodies to step in could condemn the mediation process to failure. Even if one sincerely
believes that the locals must be protected, it is best to go down the “scientific” road,
that is to say, to mobilise the authority of other administrative bodies.
People’s mediation under pressure
35 At the present time, the management of public affairs in China conforms to the model
of a sieve. All sorts of measures are taken, but affairs circulate like water in the sieve
and drain away down to the last drop at the very bottom. There at the bottom of the
sieve lies the Street office; all the spending requirements, poured in from higher up,
end up there. But when it comes to resources, the circulation goes the other way, on
the model of the extractor hood. In these conditions, the Street office lying at the base
of  the system undergoes the greatest  administrative pressure,  and suffers  the least
advantageous  conditions  in  terms  of  resources.  To  carry  out  its  workload  of
administrative tasks, the Street has to find unaided the economic resources needed for
taking on extra  agents.  Of  course,  to  defend its  interests,  the  public  can appeal  to
higher authority or organise a demonstration. Yet, this kind of defiant behaviour is
effective  only  in  extreme  cases  and  in  precise  circumstances  (appeals  to  higher
authorities or demonstrations achieve the best results on the eve of public holidays or
important events). Most minor arguments follow the normal administrative process. 
36 Affairs  arising  in  the  area  of  People’s  Mediation  lie  well  outside  the  attention  of
administrative bodies and can be resolved in a relatively satisfactory way only if they
have a direct or indirect link with overall stability. Minor affairs that have little impact
on social cohesion are always put aside for the time being and coolly dealt with later
on.  The  socialisation of  state  control  requires  that  the  government  should  play  an
important guiding role in People’s Mediation, and that administrative bodies should be
involved in the process, which clearly weakens the popular character of the mediation. 
The bureaucratisation of community mediationThe social resources of the mediation
officials
37 The Law on the Organisation of Residents’ Committees stipulates that they should set
up People’s Mediation Committees, which are organisations for the masses specially
charged with settling people’s differences. In Shanghai, the most striking phenomenon
is the way that the state administrators intervene in the mediation process; the more
serious the dispute,  the more directive is  their  role.  In  fact,  the Regulation on the
Organisation of People’s Mediation stipulates that the People’s Mediation Committee
should work under the direction of the People’s Government and the People’s Courts;
the  daily  work  of  the  former,  guiding  the  People’s  Mediation  Committee,  is  the
responsibility of the legal assistants.
38 In People’s Mediation, it is the collective disputes that have the greatest influence over
people’s lives, that is, disputes in which one party may include five or more households.
In such differences, citizens may insist on a collective action that would harm social
stability.  The  most  common  collective  differences  include  those  arising  from  the
construction of new apartment blocks, when people are forced out of their homes, or
from problems caused by enterprise work units. During the settlement process of these
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disputes, the residents’ committees have no power, and those affected very often seek
help  from the  legal  offices  of  the  Street.  Thus,  the  differences  that are  hardest  to
resolve  are  sent  up  to  the  legal  office  of  the  district  and  then  to  the  complaints
department. 
39 Yet, we should stress that, while becoming bureaucratised, People’s Mediation does not
result  directly  in  an  administrative  act  (administrative  conciliation)  or  in  a  legal
process (judicial mediation) at the Street level. The Regulation on the Organisation of
People’s Mediation stipulates that the work of the People’s Mediation Committee of the
Residents’ Committee must be done under the direction of legal assistants. Behind this
“direction”, one can see the administrative intervention of the Streets in the mediation
process. 
40 A legal assistant explains: “Our work requires great care. Legal assistants have to be
extremely experienced. What we say is in general very measured, and it’s difficult for
anyone to tell what side we are on. If we make declarations at any moment, people
might believe that it was the Streets that wanted it – and that would make it difficult to
make our official complaint at the right time. Within the Streets there are now a lot of
government officials; and, if a difference arises, they exert pressure and make our work
extremely taxing.33”
41 In most cases, the Street Bureau legal assistants base their authority on the trust that
the public have in them, but this resource is fragile. To build up their authority, the
legal assistants have developed two kinds of strategy. On the one hand, they collaborate
with the government’s administrative bodies, which have formal administrative and
legal powers: this helps the assistants to increase the speed and effectiveness of their
mediation and gives greater force to the application of the draft agreement. That also
helps in the rationalisation of decisions. The second strategy of the legal assistants is to
rely on their image and their influence among the people.
Vertical control
42 Yet, the bureaucratisation of People’s Mediation has obvious limits, because mediation
needs the agreement of both parties:  this is the radical difference between the two
types of mediation, administrative and legal. Furthermore, although the connections
between the district legal office and the Street legal section or the legal assistants are
links  between  different  hierarchical  levels,  these  connections  are  not  based  on
authority; they are based on collaborative work. In fact, the district legal bureau lacks
the means of controlling the employees’ organisation in the Street Bureau legal section;
and most  of  the  expenditure  by  legal  agents  is  born by  the  Street  and not  by  the
district. Thus, the system of vertical control is partially broken. If one asks how the
district legal bureau controls or guides the activities of the legal section of the Street,
this is the reply that is given: “We direct professional action at the level of the Street,
but we can also enforce our leadership through other means, such as the comparative
evaluation of the work, which enables us to normalise the mediation work at the level
of the Street and of the residents’ committee.34” In district A of Shanghai, the People’s
Mediation activities represent about a quarter of the legal work carried out under the
Streets’ jurisdiction. 
43 At  the  level  of  the  Street  legal  section,  comparative  evaluation  is  of  primary
importance. If this evaluation is positive, it helps to enhance the influence of the legal
section  within  the  Street  administration.  Evaluating  the  Street’s  mediation  work
enables the legal authorities to maintain their control over the Streets. However, there
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being no relationship based on direct authority, this type of control is complex and
delicate, and also unstable.
Horizontal network
44 In Shanghai at the present time, the various bodies employed in People’s Mediation
work in a network. In the case of district A, at the level of each Street, a centre has been
set up for settling community disputes, under the responsibility of senior figures in the
Streets, among them the head of the legal section and the deputy police chief. Offices
have  been  made  available  offering  various  administrative  and  legal  services,  and
People’s Mediation services. Celebrities have been invited, on a voluntary basis, to take
top  posts  in  People’s  Mediation.  The  courts  play  their  part  in,  for  example,  the
“Reception for Party Secretaries of the Streets on Thursdays”, in the “110” emergency
phone network, and in the “12348” special line system for the legal service35.
45 Unlike the vertical network described above—linking districts, Streets, small groups of
residents and the general public—this is a horizontal network. This type of network
contributes  more  than  vertical  control  towards  forming  a  civic  culture.  Yet,  the
elements that make up this network, horizontal though it is, are fundamentally organs
of  the  state.  Even  the  legal  aid  centres  have  the  characteristics  of  a  quasi-
administrative  organisation.  This  horizontal  network  must  be  considered  as
complementing the vertical administrative network. 
46 Thus, although the administration favours the bureaucratisation of People’s Mediation,
it is still limited. That derives from an intrinsic characteristic, namely, the absence of
administrative  or  legal  coercion.  Because  mediation  draws  no  authority  from  any
administrative  body,  the  two  parties  in  dispute  may  withhold  their  consent  from
conciliation.  Being  non-coercive  and  free  of  the  prescriptive  character  of  a  legal
judgment,  the  people  involved  in  the  difference  can  abort  the  application  of  any
decisions  reached.  What  is  more,  because  the  draft  agreement  has  no  prescriptive
force, the recourse to justice has little effect. So the state is taking a different path from
bureaucratisation to strengthen the application of People’s Mediation. 
The legalisation of People’s MediationFirst steps towards systematic legal enforcement
47 Regulations published on September 16th 200236 lay down that, after the two parties
have signed an agreement reached by a People’s Mediation Committee, “the persons
concerned must fulfil their duty as negotiated, and are not authorised to assume the
right to modify or cancel the mediation accord”37.
48 Before  this  text  was  published,  because  of  the  informal  nature  of  the  agreements
reached through People’s Mediation, they could often be ignored once the differences
came to court. Also the two parties involved could choose whether or not to respect the
agreement,  which  sharply  limited  the  authority  of  the  mediation.  Since  the  new
regulations  took  effect,  if  one  of  the  parties  does  not  apply  the  agreement  after
mediation,  he  or  she  risks  prosecution.  Rank  and  file  legal  agents  have  warmly
welcomed this decision: “Of course, we’re very favourable to the decision by the High
Court, which gives greater weight to our mediation agreements. People won’t be able to
take them lightly as they did before.38”
49 In reality, few cases of People’s Mediation lead to a formal agreement. In district A,
according to our interviews, of 8,000 People’s Mediation processes, only 5% led to a
formal agreement. However, the symbolic importance of the new ruling is significant.
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The work of People’s Mediation has taken on greater prestige, creating an environment
more favourable to its development.
50 Furthermore,  considering  the  mediation  agreement  as  a  civil  contract  means  that
greater care must be taken in reaching the settlement and putting it in writing. Not
only must it conform to legal requirements, and be more standardised, but the whole
process of mediation must also conform to standards.
51 Lastly, the enhanced familiarity with the law among Shanghai’s inhabitants, and their
growing capacity for making use of it are also forcing mediation work into the legal
path: “We have the impression now that in terms of legal knowledge we’re not keeping
up with the general public. When the High Court regulations had only just appeared,
people immediately started asking whether mediation agreements allowed them to go
to law. Although the High Court clearly specified that only agreements reached after
November 2002 would have the force of a civil contract and that the law would not
apply retrospectively, the public’s rising awareness of the law puts us under a lot of
pressure. We’re bracing ourselves to co-operate with the courts, to designate a number
of successful mediation agreements as models and to publicise what they will mean in
future.39” 
52 The  tendency  for  mediation  agreements  to  have  legal  weight,  while  raising  the
authoritative status of People’s Mediation, demands specialisation and standardisation
in working practice. To that end, district A has put in place a reform that constitutes an
innovative precedent for the whole country.
“Symbolic” legalisation procedures
53 As legal consolidation of People’s Mediation is in its early stages, its long-term effects
are  difficult  to  determine.  However,  we  can  already  identify  a  series  of  problems.
Firstly, the widespread recourse to People’s Mediation makes it almost impossible to
legalise the entire operation. Mediation is a response to the need for taking pressure off
the legal apparatus. In district A, the courts handle in one year only about 3,000 cases,
whereas  over  8,000  disputes  are  recorded.  Attempting  to  resolve  all  of  these  civil
differences by a legal process is unrealistic. Secondly, the professional qualifications of
those  presently  running  the  residents’  mediation  committees  are  still  far  from
adequate to legal requirements. Finally, while legalisation may help to standardise the
work of  People’s  Mediation and increase the rights and legal  responsibilities of  the
general public, people today lack the means to oppose the state bodies; and this runs
counter to the initial intention behind the reforms. 
Local governance: what are the prospects?
54 Among China’s borrowings from the West since the nineteenth century, there are many
that find an echo in traditional society. This is true of modern bureaucratic systems, of
the practice of regional autonomy, of democracy and of governance. China has a long
tradition of drawing on social forces to manage public affairs. This procedure is still
used today, but with changes in form and environment. A notable difference between
China and the West is that, in the West, what came first were the democratisation of
political  life  and  the  specialisation  of  governmental  bodies:  governance  came
afterwards. Can China skip those preliminary stages, democracy and specialisation, and
move directly to governance? That is a difficult question. 
The gaps in governance
55 The  concept  of  governance  in  Western  societies  is  not  only  a  challenge  to  the
bureaucratic system but also negates the value of democracy. However, this model of
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administrative management is in line with a democratic constitutional system. Without
democracy, there are gaps in this system. It is very visible in China: in the absence of
democracy,  citizens  have  no  way  of  setting  limits  to  the  systematic  functioning  of
public  service;  and it  is  very difficult  for rank and file  officials,  while  ordering the
community’s  affairs,  to  put  the  public’s  real  interests  first.  Citizens  may  appeal  to
higher authority, and even go outside the system by demonstrating, to exert pressure
on the decision-makers; but this process cannot become part of an official system, and
has only an extremely limited influence on important decisions, especially on current
decisions. Consequently, in the absence of democracy, the model of governance could
have an even more harmful effect than a bureaucratic system, from the point of view of
justice and the defence of individual interests. 
Mechanistic state and organic state
56 Referring to the disappearance of traditional public space in modern societies, Jürgen
Habermas mentioned the problems of socialising the state and imposing state control
over society40. Community mediation in China is an example of the socialising of state
control and of the bureaucratisation of an organised process within society. Western
states have adopted a governance model of the co-operative type, the product of a post-
bureaucratic period. It is not that governmental bodies lack any fundamental capacity
for control, but the procedures for traditional bureaucratic control are now ineffective
and the electorate is protesting against increases in public expenditure. In China, co-
operation between civil servants and the public is due to the fact that the state does not
at  present  have  available  the  resources  for  its  programme.  Its  “co-operation”  with
society is a product, not so much of the search for efficiency, as of the inability to rely
exclusively on administrative bodies. 
57 According to Giddens, modern states in the West have a “reflexive” characteristic, the
condition  necessary  for  exercising  control  over  the  centralising  of  power.  Michael
Mann uses the term “organic states” to describe modern states41. In the case of states
like  China,  the  overall volume  of  resources  that  society  provides  to  the  state  is
constantly  increasing;  and the  state  itself  endeavours  to  create  all  sorts  of  control
networks. Yet, state control still has something mechanical about it. In this system, it is
difficult to create mutual stimulation between state and society; and the state is not in
a position to conform to the trend of society’s thinking, so as to put in place flexible
controls.  So  it  is  obliged  to  rely  largely  on  networks  dependant  on  administrative
bodies. Because the administrative system has limited resources, pressure is redirected
towards society’s networks. In the context of Western governance, in addition to co-
operation between public  and private,  network building is  at  the heart  of  the new
model for state control, which is both flexible and reactive. In China, the big question
posed by the transition from mechanistic state to organic state is the blurring of the
line between state and society.
58 The relationships  between networks  and organisations  are  at  the  heart  of  theories
about  governance.  Comparing  northern  Italy  with  southern  Italy,  Robert  Putnam
considers  that  the  differences  are  due  to  the  degree  of  development  of  horizontal
networks in society, which is proportionate to that of local democracy. He holds that
horizontal  networks  help  democracy  to  mature,  while  vertical  networks  are  of  no
benefit  in  developing  a  civic  society42.  In  Shanghai,  the  vertical  networks  are  of
ramshackle construction and the horizontal networks are greatly dependant on the
state.  The  constituent  parts  of  the  transversal  networks  are  mostly  organs  of  the
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central administration, even though non governmental organisations play their part.
These networks, vertical and horizontal, can only provide a framework that is part of
the structure of governance. In this system, social participation lacks any independent
status.
59 Translation from French by Philip Liddell
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RÉSUMÉS
In recent years, governance has been the focus of growing attention among Chinese researchers.
Along  with  “authoritarianism”  and  “urban  society”,  “governance”  is  the  new  theoretical
framework for many university studies. Despite a change in terminology, the problems remain
identical: the debate centres on the mechanism by which relations are carried on between the
state and society in a developing nation such as China. We consider that the term “governance”
helps in forming a new understanding of how Chinese public services work. In that pursuit we
must not confine ourselves within normative experience but combine field study with theory.
Thus, this article is based upon the case study of mediation within the urban communities of
Shanghai. Our research in this field is only just beginning; and preliminary conclusions must be
considered together as a still unconfirmed hypothesis1.
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